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Country Institutional Differences and Multinational Advantage in Banking 
Abstract 
(190 words) 
In this paper, we seek to answer the following questions: “Do country-level institutional 
differences affect benefits of multinationality? If so, how?”  Focusing on resource and 
knowledge transfers as the key source of multinational advantage, we argue that the degree to 
which multinationals can benefit from such transfers depends on the extent to which knowledge 
or other resources are applicable across units.  We further argue that the greater the institutional 
similarity across different countries in which the MNE is present, the greater the applicability 
and transferability of resources across its units.  Hence, we claim that the greater the institutional 
similarity, the greater the firm performance and, further, the greater the effect of multinationality 
on performance. 
We test these arguments in a sample of 85 multinational banks using data from 2001-
2002.  We find that (1) institutional similarity significantly improves MNE performance, (2) 
multinationality does not have an independent effect on performance, and (3), contrary to our  
expectation, the positive effect of institutional similarity actually decreases with increasing levels 
of multinationality.  Our paper contributes to the literature on multinationality, learning and 
resource transfer within MNEs, and the contingent resource-based theory of the firm. 
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Companies continue to expand beyond their home country through foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  However, the evidence on performance benefits of multinationality is mixed (e.g. Grant, 
1987; Morck and Yeung, 1991; Ramaswamy, 1995; Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al, 1997; 
Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).   
Although the literature has advanced different theoretical arguments for why FDI might 
be profitable, such as scale economies, resource transfer and risk diversification, most empirical 
research has tended to use multinationality as a proxy for all of them (Grant, 1987; Tallman and 
Li, 1996; Hitt et al, 1997; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).  Morck and Yeung (1991) is an 
exception where the authors separately tested four arguments for and against multinational 
advantage: leveraging intangible assets, risk diversification, tax and factor cost advantages, and 
managerial motives.  Their results show that multinationality only creates a performance 
advantage when the firm possesses intangible assets, which it can leverage across its markets.  
Despite Morck and Yeung’s (1991) early contribution, subsequent research has gone 
back to testing multinational advantage by measuring multinationality rather than the distinct 
theoretical sources of value (e.g. Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al, 1997).  Moreover, although 
Morck and Yeung (1991) provided some empirical evidence of the multinational advantage 
based on the transfer of intangible assets (such as technology and brand reputation) from home 
country to subsidiaries, which is only one type of intrafirm transfer, we believe there is a need to 
examine the advantages of intrafirm transfer in MNEs more generally.  Researchers and 
practitioners have given increasing importance to intrafirm resource transfer and learning in 
MNEs as a source of MNE advantage (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986; 1989).  However, despite 
some recent research on the organizational determinants of intra-MNE knowledge transfer 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), little research has examined the 
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role of country differences in affecting the benefits from resource transfer more generally (we 
consider knowledge as a type of resource).  We argue that the potential benefits of and effective 
possibility for engaging in resource transfer in a MNE depends on similarities across countries.  
The value of transferring resources across subsidiaries is heavily influenced by whether the 
resource developed in one subsidiary is applicable in another (Hu, 1995; Goerzen and Beamish, 
2003).   
In this paper, we focus on cross-country institutional differences because the benefits of 
resource transfer take for granted that an appropriate institutional infrastructure exists in the 
destination country to exploit the resource.  However, countries vary in the degree to which 
property rights that enable economic exchange are established (North, 1990), or the degree to 
which they provide adequate protection for market participants (La Porta et al, 1998; Kaufman et 
al, 1999).  By a country’s institutional environment we refer to institutions that enable economic 
transactions and thus the functioning of the market, that is, how well property rights are defined 
and enforced in a country (North, 1990).  We argue that the more similar the institutional 
environment is across the countries in which a company is present, the more applicable the 
firm’s resources are across those countries.  In addition, aside from the ability to transfer 
intangible assets (such as technology or brands), firms can build a capability to manage under a 
given set of institutional constraints, which they can then transfer to similar environments 
(Shaver et al, 1998; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genç, 2003; Henisz, 2003).   
Further, we argue that multinationality will moderate the relationship between 
institutional similarity across countries and performance.  Since a greater level of 
multinationality provides a broader platform across which resources can be transferred, we 
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expect that the greater the multinationality of a firm, the greater the positive effect of institutional 
similarity on performance.   
We test our arguments on a sample of 85 multinational banks in the 2001-2002 period.  
Our results confirm that institutional similarity significantly enhances firm performance (ROA) 
but, surprisingly, they also show that multinationality negatively moderates the effect of 
institutional similarity: the greater the number of countries in which a firm is present, the smaller 
the positive effect of institutional similarity on performance.  
Our paper contributes to three research streams.  First, we extend the work on the link 
between multinationality and performance by introducing the institutional similarities and 
differences across countries.  We see this as an important contribution because although theory 
argues that asset transferability depends on host country conditions, empirical studies have 
largely ignored this.  Second, we add to the literature on resource transfer in MNEs by examining 
how (institutional) similarities and differences across countries determine whether a firm-specific 
asset is worth transferring and can be transferred effectively or not.  Although a lot of research is 
being done on knowledge transfer within MNEs, this work focuses almost exclusively on 
knowledge and organizational characteristics as explanatory variables (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 
1988; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), ignoring cross-country differences as determinants of 
intrafirm transfer (Hu, 1995).  Finally, we extend the contingent resource-based theory (Miller 
and Shamsie, 1996; Brush and Artz, 1999), which examines how resource value changes across 
environments by studying how the value of the resources MNE possess varies across different 
institutional environments (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genç, 2003; Prahalad and Lieberthal, 1998). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly review the 
theory on the sources of multinational advantage, focusing on the internal transfer of tangible 
  5   
and intangible resources, including knowledge.  In Section 3 we build our main hypothesis.  We 
then describe the data and our research methods in Section 4.  Section 5 reports and discusses the 
results.  We conclude with a discussion of the contributions, limitations and directions for future 
research. 
 
SOURCES OF MULTINATIONAL ADVANTAGE 
Whether international expansion improves firm performance has been an important 
research topic in the field of international strategic management.  It has been argued that 
international expansion can improve performance in at least four ways.  First and foremost, the 
theory of internalization (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hymer, 1976) postulates that firms can 
increase their profits by leveraging their intangible assets (which includes technology, brand 
reputation as well as managerial practices) across borders through FDI.  Firm-specific assets can 
exhibit increasing returns to geographic scope and allow firms to earn profits that exceed the 
added cost of operating in a foreign market (Hymer, 1976).  In fact, from an economic 
perspective, the existence of such firm-specific assets and the difficulty of transferring them in 
the market are necessary conditions for the existence of a MNE (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Teece, 1977).   
Second, in addition to the initial transfer of resources to set up operations in a foreign 
country, researchers have also claimed that MNEs can benefit from their presence in different 
countries by transferring practices across subsidiaries on an ongoing basis (Ghoshal, 1985; 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).  Third, it has been argued that international firms can benefit from 
differences in factor conditions and tax rates across countries by flexibly relocating operations 
across its different subsidiaries as a function of the evolution of factor conditions in such 
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countries (Hirsch and Lev, 1971; Kogut, 1985).  Finally, multinationals might benefit from 
geographical risk diversification if they are present in countries that have imperfectly correlated 
business cycles (Hirsch and Lev, 1971; Ghemawat, 2003).   
Despite these four distinct theoretical rationales for internationalization and the 
performance benefits of multinationals, researchers have tended to empirically examine 
multinationals’ advantage by using a single construct – multinationality – measured either as 
geographical scope or percentage of foreign sales or assets (Grant, 1987; Ramaswamy, 1995; 
Tallman and Li, 1996).  To our knowledge, only Morck and Yeung (1991) have attempted to 
simultaneously test the impact of different rationales, focusing on resource transfer, risk 
diversification, flexibility and arbitrage; finding that multinationality added value only when the 
firm possessed valuable intangible assets.  Their study demonstrated the lack of benefits arising 
from risk diversification, tax arbitrage or factor cost differences.
2   
In contrast, studies that try to capture all the different benefits of internationalization 
through a single multinationality measure have yielded mixed results and cannot attribute them 
to any specific source of multinationality advantage or disadvantage.  Although some find a 
positive relationship (Grant, 1987; Daniels and Bracker, 1989), others show no relationship at 
all, or even a negative relationship (Siddharthan and Lall, 1982; Kumar, 1984; Tallman and Li, 
1996).  More recently, researchers have also examined non-linear (curvilinear) relationships 
between multinationality and performance to capture the potentially increasing organizational 
costs of coordination that arise from greater multinationality (Hitt et al, 1997; Gomes and 
Ramaswamy, 1999).  Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) report an inverted-U relationship between 
                                                 
2 The case for risk diversification seems to be especially weak. For instance, Reuer and Leiblein (2000) have showed 
that returns to multinationals are not less volatile than those of domestic firms. 
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multinationality and performance, suggesting that the benefits of multinationality disappear 
beyond a certain level of multinationality. 
This brief review highlights several issues.  First, despite extensive research, very few 
papers distinguish between different sources of multinationality advantage.  Second, whatever 
evidence exists seems to be consistent only with the internalization theory and not other 
arguments for multinationality advantage.  This is why in this paper we focus on one source of 
multinational advantage, the source Morck and Yeung (1991) found to have a positive effect of 
firm performance: resource transfer.  And third, extant research has tended to operationalize 
multinationality using foreign sales or assets, without any attention to the differences in the 
nature of host countries in which a firm is present, although resources may not be equally 
valuable in all environments (see Goerzen and Beamish (2003) for a move in this direction).  To 
overcome this difficulty, and since the differences across countries are important for the source 
of multinationality advantage we are investigating, we distinguish among different country 
environments.  Interestingly, Morck and Yeung (1991) provided a first step in this direction as 
well.  In one of their models, they decomposed the multinationality measure into number of 
developed countries, developing countries and tax havens.  They found that their results about 
the value creating nature of intangible assets only hold for (the number of) developed countries.  
Although their test was motivated by a different objective, i.e. to test whether factor cost 
differences through the developing countries component or tax arbitrage through the tax havens 
component were sources of multinational advantage, their results are consistent with our 
argument: that resources are not equally valuable in all settings, and hence the nature of host 
countries is a determinant of the success of resource transfer.  
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Building on Morck and Yeung’s (1991) findings, we argue that whereas there might be 
value creation potential in transferring intangible assets (including managerial practices) across 
countries, the possibility of and success in doing so depends on the similarity of the country 
environments among which the transfer is taking place.  Surprisingly, there has been little 
research on how country differences affect resource transfer and its supposed benefits.  Most 
research on the determinants of resource or knowledge transfer in MNEs has focused on 
resource/knowledge characteristics and/or organizational characteristics either at the subsidiary 
or at the headquarters level (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000).  We address this gap by focusing on the degree of institutional similarity 
across countries, which we will discuss in more detail below.  
Moreover, a burgeoning literature in international strategy argues that other than 
capabilities in marketing or R&D, one can also conceive of a capability of managing in a 
particular institutional environment (Henisz, 2003).  The central argument here is that firms that 
grow and operate in a given institutional environment develop capabilities to manage in that 
particular environment (Oliver, 1997).  These capabilities can then become a source of advantage 
when the firm expands into another country with a similar institutional environment (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genç, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 2002; Henisz, 2003).  Although these papers do 
provide some encouraging evidence that hints at existence of such capabilities, more research in 
this area is needed.   
Host country characteristics also explain the added costs of multinationality.  The 
research stream on the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997) has 
empirically demonstrated that compared to local, indigenous companies, foreign firms initially 
experience difficulties when they enter a new country, because of their lack of understanding of 
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the local culture and institutions (economic, political and legal).  Despite its usefulness, there is a 
need to unpack the different components or dimensions of the liability of foreignness such as 
national culture and legal, political and administrative institutions to examine which of them are 
most important for firm performance.   
In that regard, there has been some research on how cultural differences across the host 
and home countries affect MNE behavior and performance in entering new countries (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996).  In contrast, despite some theoretical 
treatments of the import of host countries’ institutional environments in affecting MNE behavior 
(Murtha and Lenway, 1994; Henisz, 2003), there has been less empirical research on how this 
drives the costs of these firms.  Although studies of the relationship between multinationality and 
performance, especially those positing a curvilinear relationship, argue that managing in a 
diverse set of environments is the main driver of costs, these studies have not measured or tested 
how institutionally diverse the geographical scope of MNEs really is and how it affects MNE 
performance.  That is our aim. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Based on the preceding review, we argue that the potential and possibility for intrafirm 
transfers in MNEs depends on the particular shape of a firm’s international presence.  Our central 
argument is that similar institutional environments will enhance the value of transferring and the 
transferability of resources among these countries.  Before developing this argument, it is 
necessary to clearly define the concept of institutional environment, which is not well developed.   
Institutions have traditionally been defined as social conventions or tacit and internalized 
agreements on what constitutes the appropriate behavior in a situation that lead to patterns of 
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routine or regularized behavior (North, 1990).  This definition encompasses both formal and 
informal institutions, that is, institutions that are codified and embedded in law (formal) as well 
as those that remain tacit or implicit in the country’s culture (informal).   
In this paper we want to focus on a more narrow notion of institutions and, in particular, 
legal and economic institutions and to separate it from culture which encompasses the values, 
assumptions, norms and rituals of a society (Hofstede, 1980).  For instance, although North 
(1990) adopted a broad definition of institutions, in his empirical case studies he focused on the 
degree of definition and enforcement of property rights (see also Murtha and Lenway, 1994).   
Recent research in economics has developed a consistent set of dimensions of the 
institutional environment which include the rule of law (i.e. definition and protection of private 
property rights, and enforcement of contracts), effectiveness of government policies (i.e. 
independence of bureaucracy, degree of regulatory burden) and the mechanisms through which 
politicians are elected and held accountable for their actions (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton, 1999).  In this paper we focus on the first two, partly because the last of these 
dimensions deals with political stability, which has usually been associated with political risk, a 
separate though equally important construct (Kobrin, 1979).  We focus on regulations and 
bureaucracy because these delineate permissible business practices, products and processes, 
hence defining what resources can be profitably transferred and whether they can be 
meaningfully used in the new environment.  We also consider property rights because they 
define to what extent resources can be used to generate rents in the marketplace and to what 
extent those rents can be captured by the MNE. 
Research on expansion patterns of MNEs shows that firms first enter into countries that 
are geographically, culturally and socially similar to their home country (Johanson and Vahlne, 
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1977).  Similarly, we claim that the value of cross-fertilization among MNE subsidiaries is only 
possible among those subsidiaries that share a common institutional environment.  From a 
property rights point of view, if two countries differ in their institutional environment it means 
that one has a well-defined system of property rights that are enforced whereas the other one is 
characterized by poorly, loosely defined property rights that are irregularly enforced.  These 
differences are likely to make a successful practice in one country irrelevant for the other.  For 
instance, methods to successfully deal with suppliers of equipment and security services in a 
country with poorly-defined property rights are of little use in contracting with the same type of 
suppliers in a country in which property rights are clearly specified and enforced, and vice versa.  
The context of the transaction, the degree of reliance on social ties and reputation versus a 
contract would also differ.  Similarly, variance in regulations can make the transfer of resources 
meaningless.  A marketing campaign carried out in one country might not be profitable to carry 
out in another where regulations do not permit the use of certain images, or the use of certain 
media for certain products on which the marketing campaign was based.  Differences in 
regulations on technology transfer, such as the degree to which they require licensing of 
technology, prohibit use of certain technologies, or force a company to locate at a certain place 
where complementary location-specific assets required to take advantage of firm-specific 
resources do not exist, can also make transfer worthless and/or impossible.  Several authors have 
recently provided anecdotal evidence supporting these arguments.  Prahalad and Lieberthal 
(1998), for instance, document the difficulties developed country firms faced when they entered 
into less developed countries such as Brazil.  More recently, Guillen (2001) shows that many 
resources developed at home may not apply in other countries due to different societal 
configurations or business-models.  This argument about institutional differences works in both 
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directions; that is, regardless of whether the country where the resource to be transferred 
originates is institutionally developed or underdeveloped.   
In addition to assets such as technology and marketing, we argue that institutional 
differences across the states in which a MNE is present can also affect the value and capability of 
transferring more intangible managerial practices and knowledge.  Some managerial practices 
such as the way to deal with politicians, regulators and bureaucrats can be specific to a country.  
If a firm develops a capability to manage in an environment where market institutions are less 
developed (i.e. property rights are not well defined and enforced), it can successfully expand into 
other countries characterized by a similar level of institutional development (Henisz, 2003).  As 
argued, the essence of the capability to operate in and manage the institutional environment 
focuses on the ability to deal with the political and regulatory actors and avoid political and 
contractual hazards as well as to lobby for favorable policy changes (Henisz, 2003).  From this 
standpoint, government intervention in economic activity and protection of property rights are 
important elements of the institutional environment.   
Government intervention can take the form of direct ownership of enterprises or 
excessive regulation, which can then be used with discretion, increasing dependence on the 
government.  In such cases, the skill to manage relationships with those that hold decision-
making power will be much more critical, since the firm’s fortunes are dependent on such skills.  
Once managers understand the concerns of policymakers and when they would be more or less 
likely to engage in adverse policies, not only the firm can avoid alienating policy makers or 
bureaucrats, but they can also transfer these skills to other environments characterized by such 
extent of regulation.  Property rights protection is important because in absence of proper 
protections, firms will be increasingly dependent on the government’s goodwill (Kobrin, 1979; 
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Murtha and Lenway, 1994) in carrying out transactions as well as in gaining compensation when 
their rights are violated.  Governments can force other parties to reach an agreement with the 
foreign firm, or to pay adequate compensation. 
From a resource transfer standpoint, property rights protection and regulatory burden are 
important aspects of the institutional environment.  Many of the skills developed in a well-
developed institutional environment may not be valuable in a less-developed institutional 
environment, either due to lack of infrastructure necessary to implement those skills, or due to 
inappropriability of the rents that could be potentially derived from them.  For instance, in the 
context of the industry studied here (i.e. banking industry), it is generally argued that credit-
scoring techniques can be transferred across countries (Litan, Masson and Pomerleano, 2001).  
However, in many developing countries these scoring techniques may not work simply because 
the information necessary to evaluate someone’s creditworthiness does not exist or is not 
collected.  Regulations can also hamper transfer of assets or practices.  Goold and Campbell 
(1998) give the example of labeling regulations that prevented a firm from using the same bottle 
label across different countries.  Further, risk assessment techniques that deliver proven results in 
countries with a sophisticated financial market are not necessarily applicable in countries with 
less sophisticated financial markets where there is much less customer financial information 
available. 
These arguments build on the basic idea of the contingent value of a resource or a 
capability (Miller and Shamsie, 1996; Brush and Artz, 1999) which has also been applied to the 
international context and, in particular, to the extent to which MNEs from developing-countries 
have an advantage over MNEs from developed countries when they move in other developing 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2003).  Here we extend this line of research by exploring 
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the effect of institutional similarity in the overall MNE on the potential for cross-subsidiary 
learning and resource leverage.  To summarize the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of institutional similarity across the countries in 
which a MNE is present, the higher the MNE performance. 
 
Further, we argue that multinationality will moderate the relationship between 
institutional similarity across countries and performance.  This follows directly from the 
arguments regarding the benefit of leveraging intangible assets across countries in which the 
MNE is present.  Multinationality enhances performance because it allows the firm to earn 
increasing returns on its intangible assets (no matter where they are developed) by transferring 
them across subsidiaries.  Since the firm doesn’t have to incur the cost of developing these 
resources every time they are transferred, the more multinational a firm is, the higher the returns 
it can earn on these resources.  Therefore, the effect of institutional similarity should be 
amplified with increasing levels of multinationality, since now there are more countries where a 
given resource can be transferred to (or from).  Thus, we contend that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of multinationality, the larger the positive effect of 
institutional similarity on performance. 
 
METHODS 
We chose the banking industry as our empirical context, for several reasons.  First, its 
service nature enables us to discard flexibility as one of the three possible sources of 
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multinational value, since most services have to be produced where they are consumed. (Despite 
the recent diffusion of online banking, banks usually have to be physically present in the territory 
to serve their customers).  Second, the banking industry has undergone rapid worldwide 
consolidation in the last decade: FDI in banking has soared since the early 1990s (Litan et al., 
2001).  Financial crises that have increased the need to restructure have led to selling unhealthy 
banks to foreign banks, and privatization of government banks has also accelerated this process.  
As a result, both in Eastern Europe and in Latin America the foreign owned share of bank assets 
have increased sharply (Guillen, 2001; The Economist, 2002).   
Third and more importantly, despite this increasing internationalization of banking, the 
benefits of global presence in this industry are not clear.  Tschoegl (2002) argues that retail 
banking is essentially a local business and expanding internationally does not pay off in general.  
On the other hand, in other segments such as investment banking, a global reach seems to be 
necessary (Litan et al., 2001).  However, in a recent test of the extent of globalization in banking, 
Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003) find that subsidiaries of MNEs usually prefer a host-
nation bank to a bank from their home country for cash management services, a set of services 
that can be provided by both local and foreign banks.  They argue that this may pose a limit on 
the geographic reach of banks.  Similarly, in a survey of globalization in banking, Berger, 
DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000) find that in many European countries local banks are more 
efficient than foreign banks (except for American banks), which suggests that there are limits to 
globalization of the banking industry.  Therefore, this is an appropriate industry to study the 
effect of the degree of multinationality on MNE performance. 
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Sample 
Our population being all commercial banks with foreign operations in 2001-2002, we 
constructed our sample in the following way.  Following past research (Berger et al., 2000; 
Miller and Parkhe, 2002), we used BankScope, a comprehensive database of more than 11,000 
banks that provides financial performance as well as ownership data.  The database identifies 
two levels of bank ownership: direct and ultimate.  Direct ownership indicates the percentage of 
shares a shareholder directly owns in a bank.  Since in many cases the direct owners of a bank 
are themselves owned by other banks, the database traces the shareholding information (by 
focusing on the largest shareholder at each level) until it reaches an owner that is indicated as 
independent (a company in which no single shareholder owns more than 25%), in which case 
this firm is labeled as the ‘ultimate owner’.  In other cases, a company is indicated as being the 
ultimate owner of a given bank without any specific shareholding structure being disclosed.  The 
database uses various sources of ownership information including annual reports, personal 
correspondence, trade publications, and filings with regulatory authorities, among others. 
Of the 11,000 banks we extracted information on all the commercial bank subsidiaries 
that we identified as majority-owned by foreign shareholders.  We also excluded non-bank 
owners from the sample, which allows us to control for business diversification (e.g. Geringer et 
al, 1989; Hitt et al, 1997).  This search resulted in 1571 commercial bank subsidiaries that are 
majority owned by foreign banks, 933 of which have an identified ultimate owner.  We focus on 
majority-controlled subsidiaries because we believe banks cannot transfer resources across their 
organization unless they have managerial control (of the subsidiaries), which usually requires a 
majority ownership.  There were 151 ultimate holding banks that constituted our initial sample, 
from which we eliminated 13 for which no consolidated performance data was available.   
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Next, we proceeded to gather the international footprint of each parent bank for 2001 by 
identifying those bank subsidiaries they controlled (i.e. had at least 50 % of shares).  First, we 
checked whether they were majority owners of the subsidiaries for which they were designated 
as ultimate owners.  We discarded several of these subsidiaries because the ultimate holding 
banks were minority owners (i.e. less than 50 %) or ownership information was not available.  
Second, for the sample of 138 banks for which we had consolidated performance data we 
proceeded to identify all foreign subsidiaries that did not have a reported ultimate owner and for 
which these banks were listed as direct owners (with majority control).  With these two 
procedures we identified all the countries in which sample banks had majority-owned bank 
subsidiaries in 2001.   
 
Measures 
We measure the performance of multinational banks in 2002 using return on average 
assets and return on average equity, effectively allowing for one year lag between the dependent 
and the independent variables.  These measures are in line with previous studies of 
multinationality and performance (e.g. Hitt et al, 1997; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).  To test 
for robustness, we also used net interest margin as alternative measures of performance.  All 
these bank-level performance data come from BankScope. We describe the independent 
variables below. 
Multinationality.  Following past research and for purposes of comparability and 
cumulativeness (Tallman and Li, 1996; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999), we measured 
multinationality as the number of countries in which a sample bank operated in 2001, including 
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the home country (i.e. country where the headquarters are located).  Countries where a sample 
bank operates are those in which it has one or more majority-owned subsidiary. 
Institutional similarity.  We measure the degree of institutional similarity across the 
countries in which a bank is present using the Heritage Foundation’s (2003) index of economic 
freedom, which assigns a score from 1 to 5 (1 being the most free) to a country on ten different 
dimensions and then uses the simple average of these scores to reach an overall economic 
freedom score for each country.  Data is available for 155 countries.  Following our theoretical 
discussion, we focused on two institutional similarity dimensions: regulatory environment as it 
pertains to the banking industry; and the level of property rights protection.  The ‘banking and 
finance’ measure focuses on regulations in the banking sector such as ease of obtaining a 
banking license, whether regulations are applied uniformly, whether foreign banks can freely 
open branches and establish subsidiaries, and to what extent activities of banks are restricted.  A 
low score indicates a country where banks can offer many products and compete freely, there is 
relatively free entry and little government influence over allocation of credit.  The property rights 
measure captures how well property rights are defined and enforced.  To measure the impact of 
the overall institutional environment that encompasses other dimensions that are relevant for 
resource transfer (labor regulations, foreign investment regulations and overall regulatory 
burden), we also test our models using the overall economic freedom score. 
In our sample, there are only four banks for which institutional data is missing for a host 
country.  This may have introduced a slight bias in calculating institutional similarity for these 
four banks.  However, dropping these four observations does not affect our results.  
We construct a measure of institutional similarity by calculating the standard deviation of 
scores for all countries in which a bank is present, including its home country, for the banking 
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and finance, property rights protection and overall scores.  The higher the standard deviation, the 
more institutionally diverse are the countries in which a bank operates.  Therefore a high 
standard deviation indicates institutional dissimilarity.   
Multinationality x institutional similarity interaction.  To test H2, we created a 
multiplicative interaction for multinationality and institutional similarity.  However, to minimize 
the impact of collinearity which structurally arises from multiplicative interactions with their 
main effects, we centered both variables prior to creating the interaction term. 
Control variables.  Following past research, and to distinguish resource transfer from 
scale economies and other size-related effects, we control for firm size through natural logarithm 
of the banks’ total assets.  We also controlled for a curvilinear effect of multinationality by 
including its square term.  Past research has argued that the costs of multinationality can 
outweigh its benefits beyond a certain level of multinationality, largely due to coordination costs 
(Hitt et al, 1997; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).  Furthermore, a recent paper has argued that 
the form of relationship might be different in service companies, and found a U-shaped instead 
of an inverted-U relationship found in earlier studies (Capar and Kotabe, 2003).  Finally, we 
include the home countries of the banks as a potential determinant of performance (Porter, 1990).  
Past research shows that American banks are more efficient than local banks as well as other 
foreign banks (Berger et al., 2000; Miller and Parkhe, 2002).  To control for this argument, we 
created three dummies for banks headquartered in US, Japan and Europe, respectively.  Data on 
the home country for the sample companies comes from BankScope.   
After excluding observations for which either data for the dependent or the independent 
variables were missing, our final sample contains 85 banks.  Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for our variables.  Table 2 displays the pairwise correlation matrix which shows that 
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there is no significant issue of bivariate collinearity, although the two institutional similarity 
scores we focus on (standard deviations of banking and finance regulation scores and overall 
economic freedom scores) are significantly and highly correlated.   
*** TABLES 1-2 HERE *** 
We then constructed a linear regression equation to test our hypotheses.  The full model 
we estimated by performing a robust regression which uses a White-robust estimator that 
corrects for heteroskedasticity is as follows: 
Performance = B0 + B1*Size + B2*# of countries + B3*Institutional similarity + B4*(# of 
countries)*(Institutional similarity) + e 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 reports the results for the estimation of three models: the model with only the 
controls (model 1), the one with controls and main effects (model 2) and the full model (model 
3), which is significant and has greater explanatory power than the two previous models.  
Inspection of variance inflation factors (VIF) does not reveal any multicollinearity problems (all 
VIF are well below 10, the usual cut-off).   
Although we tested the results using three different institutional similarity measures 
(banking and finance regulations, property rights protection, and overall economic freedom), the 
results are qualitatively similar.  We report results only for the models that used overall 
economic freedom variable and banking and finance as measures of institutional similarity, but 
for the sake of convenience, only discuss results for the models using overall economic freedom 
scores.  Whenever the results differ materially, we report the differences.   
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We also tested models using the two different performance measures (ROA and ROE).  
Our models using return on equity were not significant, suggesting that there are other factors 
that drive the return on equity.  This might be partly explained by the fact that banking is a 
highly leveraged industry and the amount of capital that a bank has to have differs significantly 
across countries (although recent agreements such as the new Basle Accord will reduce these 
differences in the near future).  A bank’s capital also depends on the risk profile of its assets, 
although once again, countries differ in their regulations about which assets are classified into 
which risk group and how much capital has to be kept for assets in each risk group.  Since banks 
can differ significantly in their risk taking behavior, their equity can also differ significantly, 
even within the same country.  We therefore use ROA as our dependent variable. 
*** TABLE 3 HERE *** 
In model 1 we see that the effect on ROA of size (the logarithm of total assets) is 
negative and significant.  This means that bigger is not better, but worse.  This sign and size of 
this coefficient is consistent across all models.  The size coefficient is the second most 
consequential, after the one for institutional dissimilarity in the full model.  A 100% increase in 
size, for instance, reduces ROA by 10.5%.
3  This result suggest that disadvantages of size 
dominate possible scale effects.  Our results are consistent with the banking literature which 
shows that usually X-inefficiencies overpowers scale economies (Berger, Hunter and Timme, 
1993).   
Model 1 also shows that multinationality has a significant and positive effect on 
performance.  However, this includes all the possible sources of advantages of multinationality 
and doesn’t allow us to distinguish among different explanations (Morck and Yeung, 1991).  
Expanding into one more country increases ROA about 3%, holding all else constant, although it 
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is important to recognize that size and multinationality are highly correlated.  It is also important 
to note that the squared term is not significant, contrary to recent studies that showed a 
curvilinear relationship (Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).   
Last but not least, none of the home-country dummies are statistically significant across 
all models.  Following Porter’s (1990) argument, we expected that multinational banks which 
have their home base in economically developed countries such as the US, Japan and countries in 
Europe which are characterized by a sophisticated demand and intense supply would exhibit a 
greater ROA relative to banks which are headquartered elsewhere.  The results show that banks 
headquartered in US, Japan or any European country do not significantly outperform banks 
based in less developed countries.   
Model 2 incorporates the institutional similarity variable.  We see that institutional 
similarity has a large and positive effect on performance.  However, the coefficient is marginally 
significant.  Actually, in models using other institutional similarity variables, this coefficient is 
not significant, although the sign is always negative and large.  We also see that multinationality 
still exerts a significant and positive, linear influence on performance.  This time, the coefficient 
of the multinationality square term is also significant and positive (not significant in models 
using banking and finance or property rights but still positive), suggesting a U-shaped 
relationship, supporting the results of Capar and Kotabe (2003).  Finally, the explanatory power 
of the model increases from an R
2 of 0.13 to 0.22. 
Moving to the full model which incorporates the interaction term (model 3), the picture 
changes dramatically.  First, the results for the full model support our first hypothesis regardless 
of the measure of institutional similarity we use (the results for property rights protection are 
significant at the 10% level, and significant at 5% level for the other two variables).  Regardless 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 ROA = -0.152*ln(TOTASSET). ∆ROA = -0.152*(ln(2*TOTASSET)-ln(TOTASSET) = -0.152*ln2  = -0.105 
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of the number of countries a bank operates in, there is a statistically significant and positive 
association between institutional similarity and performance (note that since our variable 
measures dissimilarity, the coefficient is negative).  This suggests that multinational banks that 
operate in dissimilar institutional environments have difficulties in transferring their practices 
across countries and thus successfully operating in them.  In all cases the coefficient for 
institutional dissimilarity is the largest (-0.42 for banking and finance, -0.32 for property rights 
protection, and -0.78 for overall economic freedom), which suggests practical significance.   
As for our second hypothesis, which stated that multinationality would enhance the value 
of institutional similarity, the results are opposite to those we predicted.  Although the interaction 
term between institutional dissimilarity and multinationality is significant, its sign is positive 
instead of negative.  This means that the more countries a firm is in, the less positive the effect of 
institutional similarity across countries on performance.  This suggests that the significantly 
negative effect of operating in institutionally dissimilar environments on performance decreases 
as the geographical scope of the bank increases.  In other words, increased multinationality 
mitigates the positive effect of institutional similarity on performance.  This means that as a firm 
becomes more multinational, its dependence on institutional similarity as a driver of performance 
decreases.  Highly multinational firms, therefore, can afford to operate in a diverse set of 
environments, unlike their less internationalized competitors.   
The fact that multinationality decreases the effect of institutional similarity begs the 
question of whether there is a level of multinationality beyond which there is a negative 
relationship between institutional similarity and performance.  It is important to note that the 
coefficient of the interaction term between institutional dissimilarity and multinationality (0.07) 
is very small compared to that of institutional dissimilarity (-0.78).  Still, the first derivative of 
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ROA on institutional dissimilarity becomes positive when the number of countries exceeds 11 (-
0.78 + 0.07 M > 0, M = 11.1; the corresponding figure is 9 countries for models using banking 
and finance or property rights as institutional similarity variables).  This means that for a 
multinational that is present in 12 or more countries, it pays to expand into institutionally 
dissimilar countries.  Given that this threshold level of 12 countries is well within the bounds of 
the multinationality measure in our sample (maximum of 24 countries), the moderating effect of 
multinationality on institutional similarity is capable of reversing the negative effect of 
institutional dissimilarity in several instances in the sample.  
The fact that multinationality actually diminishes the detrimental impact of being present 
in institutionally dissimilar countries and can even overturn it could be due to the existence of 
clusters of institutionally similar countries within the broader international footprint of a bank.  
Learning from experience in clusters of institutionally similar countries through transferring 
practices within the cluster could allow such banks to cope with the liability of foreignness in 
these countries and, hence, exhibit greater performance.  This is a real possibility in our sample.  
For instance, despite having a high value of institutionally dissimilarity (more than one standard 
deviation larger than the mean), the sixteen countries in which ABN AMRO Holding NV is 
present are clustered in three groups in terms of institutional similarity: four countries exhibit an 
overall index of economic freedom between three and four, seven other countries have an index 
score between two and three and, finally, five countries show an index below two.  The role of 
multinationality comes from the fact that the greater the number of distinct states in which a bank 
is present, the more likely it is that there will be clusters of institutionally similar countries.   
It is interesting to note that the direct effect of multinationality disappears when the 
interaction term is included in the model (this is true for all models).  In conjunction with this, it 
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is noteworthy that the effect of the square term of multinationality is positive and significant, but 
very small (in other models, neither the square term nor the linear term are significant).  These 
results cast doubt on the existence of a meaningful and significant direct relationship between 
multinationality and performance (e.g. Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al, 1997; Gomes and 
Ramaswamy, 1999).  Consistent with our expectations, multinationality has a significant effect 
on performance only when certain other conditions occur (Morck and Yeung, 1991), in our case, 
the presence of a bank in institutionally different environments.   
To recap, we find that (1) institutional similarity across countries where a bank operates 
has a strong positive influence on bank performance; (2) this effect decreases with increasing 
multinationality; (3) multinationality does not improve performance in and of itself, (4) being 
more multinational improves performance only when the firm operates in diverse institutional 
environments and, (5) multinationals with a global footprint can even benefit from being present 
in more institutionally diverse countries. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper contributes to the literatures on multinationality, intraorganizational learning 
and resource transfer, and the resource-based theory of the firm.  First, we isolate 
intraorganizational resource transfer from the other sources of multinational advantage and show 
that it is a function of the similarities across the countries in which the firm is present.  More 
specifically, we demonstrated that up to a certain level of multinationality, international firms 
suffer from being present in different institutional environments.  We interpret this as providing 
evidence that banks which operate in institutionally dissimilar countries have difficulties in 
transferring resources (including managerial practices and knowledge) across them.  We believe 
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that this adds an important contingency to the discussion on intraorganizational learning and 
resource sharing in MNEs (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000).  
Our focus on the institutional dimension of country environments extends the literature on the 
effect of the institutional environment on MNE behavior and performance (Murtha and Lenway, 
1994; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Henisz and Delios, 2002).  This result confirms our contingent 
approach to the value of a firm’s resources in the sense that the benefits of being present in 
multiple countries are a function of the differences in the institutional environment across those 
countries.  This extends the recent work on the contingent value of resources (Shamsie and 
Miller, 1996; Brush and Artz, 1999), particularly when applied to differences across countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2003) rather than periods or products. 
Our second contribution lies in examining the performance effect of multinationality (e.g. 
Geringer et al, 1989; Tallman and Li, 1996; Hitt et al, 1997).  We argued that multinationality 
should strengthen the positive performance effect of institutional similarity, since it would 
provide more opportunities to transfer resources.  Our results are not consistent with this view.  
Although for firms with a very narrow international footprint it pays off to be present in 
institutionally similar countries, it is more beneficial for firms with a broader footprint to be in 
diverse institutional environments.  Between two firms present in equally diverse environments, 
the one that is more multinational will have a better performance.  We conjectured that greater 
multinationality increases the likelihood that firms would actually be present in several clusters 
of countries each of which consist of very similar institutional countries, allowing the firm to 
transfer resources within each cluster, although the stark differences between clusters would 
show a high overall level of institutional country diversity. 
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Third, we further contribute to the multinationality-performance literature by showing 
that there is not a clear direct relationship between the two.  Although we find a statistically 
significant direct curvilinear effect on performance, we fail to replicate this relationship in 
different models, and the coefficient of the square term is very small.  In fact, an F-test that tests 
the joint significance of both the linear and square term of multinationality indicates that both 
can be dropped from the equation (p(H0 holds) = 0.17).  In contrast, we find that the effect of 
multinationality is contingent on other variables, in particular, institutional similarity.  This is 
consistent with Morck and Yeung (1991) who showed that multinationality did not have a direct 
effect and suggests that multinationality does not provide advantages in the form of tax arbitrage 
or risk diversification.  Most previous studies cannot arrive at these fine-grained conclusions 
because they have not examined different sources of multinational value, but instead used 
multinationality as a proxy for all the different sources of multinational advantage (Hitt et al, 
1997; Gomes and Ramaswamy, 1999).   
Finally, our results on the other control variables challenge conventional wisdom in two 
ways.  First, the negative effect of size on performance points out to the existence of 
diseconomies rather than economies of scale in banking.  Second, Porter’s (1990) theory of 
sophistication of home country as a crucial determinant of MNEs performance is not supported 
in our study.   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
We believe the main limitations of this paper are empirical.  The first limitation comes 
from the relatively small sample.  Unfortunately, at this point we were able to include only those 
banks that were designated as the ultimate owner of a foreign bank.  Although this is a safe way 
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to proceed, it might have resulted in the exclusion of other multinational banks.  Despite this 
limitation, we do not believe there is a systematic bias in our sample selection.  We cannot think 
of a reason that would make banks that are ultimate holders behave and perform systematically 
different than the excluded banks.   
The second limitation arises from measurement.  By including only majority-owned 
foreign subsidiaries, we are probably underestimating the geographic scope of banks since some 
foreign banks might only operate in some countries through branches.  However, branches 
usually do not offer the same breadth of services as a subsidiary (Clarke, Cull, Martinez-Peria, 
and Sanchez, 2001).  Further, the institutional dissimilarity measure might also be imperfect. 
Arguably, the institutional environment of a country is a complex and multidimensional 
construct.  However, there are not many empirical studies that measure institutions across 
countries, and we believe we used the best of what is available at this point.  We took into 
account existing descriptions and existing measures of what is meant by an institutional 
environment (Henisz, 2003; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999). Future studies, 
though, should build more detailed measures of institutional environment that are comparable 
across countries. 
A third limitation is that we did not include other country environment dimensions in our 
dissimilarity measures.  For instance, differences in national culture (Hofstede, 1980) might have 
a stronger effect than institutional dissimilarity.  Therefore, future research should consider 
differences across countries in culture in assessing the possibility of intraorganizational resource 
transfer within MNEs. 
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Finally, the generalizability of our findings is bounded by the nature of the sample 
examined.  Thus, we caution extending the results to other periods as well as other industries.  
Future research should undertake such endeavor.   
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable        N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Max Min
ROAA        107 0.633  0.770  3.26 -2.27
ROAE          107 8.766 10.355  34.07 -37.95
TOTASSET        190  10.884 1.917  6.03 14.05
NUMCTRY        200  4.760 4.351 2  24
NUMCTRYSQ      199  10.596  36.621 0.19  303.99
USHOME          200 0.080 0.272 0  1
EURHOME            200 0.480 0.501 0 1
JAPANHOME          200  0.110 0.314 0 1
BKG&FN_STDV      92  0.832  0.482 0  2.12
ECONFREE_STDV      92  0.437  0.309 0  1.34
NUMCTRY*BGK&FN_STDV           92 3.813 3.975 0 17.32
NUMCTRY*ECONFREE_STDV            92 2.027 2.154 0 10.75
  
TABLE 2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
                ROAA ROAE TOTASSET NUMCTRY NUMCTRYSQ USHOME EURHOME
        
ROAA              1.0000
ROAE  0.7864***  1.0000          
TOTASSET  -0.2980***  0.0062         1.0000  
NUMCTRY      -0.0163 0.1283 0.4778***  1.0000        
NUMCTRYSQ                0.0744 0.0986 0.0371 -0.0135 1.0000
USHOME  -0.0614                -0.0174 0.0013 0.1140 -0.0490 1.0000
EURHOME            0.0219 0.0443 -0.0172 -0.0299 0.1885*** -0.2833***  1.0000  
JAPANHOME          0.0663 -0.0348 -0.0492 0.0452 -0.0581  -0.1037 -0.3378*** 
BKG&FN_STDV          -0.1309 -0.2415**  -0.0629 -0.1814* 0.1614 -0.1999*  -0.0541 
ECONFREE_STDV  -0.1304              -0.1449 -0.0711 -0.1345 0.2668**  -0.0556 -0.0519
NUMCTRY* 
BKG&FN_STDV 
-0.0387                0.0430 0.2918*** 0.4934*** 0.0869 -0.0733 -0.0562
NUMCTRY* 
ECONFREE_STDV 
-0.0843                0.0461 0.2956*** 0.5271*** 0.1626 0.1210 -0.0797










JAPANHOME        1.0000      
BKG&FN_STDV           0.0893 1.0000 
ECONFREE_STDV  -0.1768* 0.5876***  1.0000      
NUMCTRY*BKG&FN_STDV      -0.0540  0.5260*** 0.3021*** 1.0000    
NUMCTRY* 
ECONFREE_STDV 
-0.1844*      0.3399***  0.5985*** 0.7520*** 1.0000  
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 3. Robust Regression Results for MNE Performance 
Measure of institutional similarity:  Overall economic freedom  Banking and finance 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Dependent variable: ROAA         
Logarithm of total assets  -0.152***            -0.200*** -0.206*** -0.152*** -0.197*** -0.202***
 0.047  0.050 0.050 0.047  0.050 0.051 
# of countries  0.032***        0.028** 0.008  0.032*** 0.030** 0.005 
  0.012  0.013        0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012
# of countries squared  0.001  0.002*  0.002**  0.001      0.001 0.001
  0.001            0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
USHOME  dummy              -0.206 -0.129 -0.103 -0.206 -0.177 -0.024
  0.223            0.238 0.220 0.223 0.244 0.179
EURHOME  dummy              0.069 -0.028 -0.028 0.069 -0.004 0.009
  0.162            0.176 0.175 0.162 0.174 0.174
JAPANHOME dummy  0.029  -0.085  -0.010  0.029  0.033  0.059 
  0.257            0.289 0.290 0.257 0.280 0.282
Institutional dissimilarity    -0.421**       -0.784** -0.194 -0.424** 
             0.212 0.339 0.145 0.193
# of countries * institutional dissimilarity      0.075**    0.047*** 
           0.037   0.017
Const.              2.117*** 2.932*** 3.108*** 2.117*** 2.851*** 3.027***
  0.513  0.579 0.597 0.513 0.596 0.606 
Number of obs  103  85  85  103  85   
F(7, 77)     2.45           2.82 2.68 2.45 2.54
Prob > F  0.0304**  0.0114**  0.0120  0.0304**  0.0209   
R-squared             0.1300 0.2238 0.2360 0.1300 0.2128
 
All independent variables are lagged one year, and hence refer to 2001 values. 
Numbers under the coefficients are White-Huber heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. 
  40